A series of cross-cultural studies are reported with regard to finding generality in cognitive interaction across culturally heterogeneous subject groups. Three kinds of cognitive interaction were examined within the frame of the affective systems:
It has been known for some time that there is interaction among concept, subject, and scale samples in the determination of semantic space structure. We are concerned with such interaction in its own right, as a basic phenomenon of human cognition variously known as"balance" (Heider, 1946) ," consonance" (Festinger, 1957) ," psycho-logic " (Abelson and Rosenberg, 1958) , and " congruity" (Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955) . Osgood (1960) suggests that laws of cognitive dynamics also operate in the conduct of human affairs, such as in international relations. Cognitive interaction will be discussed in this paper, with regard to the following three general areas:
(1) concept/scale interaction; (2) interaction among cognitive elements; and (3) subject/scale interaction. In dealing with the first two, we will be concerned with cross-cultural generality of cognitive phenomena.
Concerning the last, we will discuss cultural uniqueness. Meaning (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957) , that the usual three-factor semantic space coalesced into two (Benevolence and Dynamism) for political concepts. It is made evident that the scale composition of semantic spaces can be to some extent modified in terms of objects of judgment . It has been noted that the relative salience of, and relationship among, semantic factors may vary with the concept class being judged. Some scales change their " factorial " meaning in the semantic space, as the concept classes are changed. Tucker's early study (1955) offers an example that the Activity factor is the most dominant factor with many scales rotating toward this factor, in the judging of aesthetic (visual) objects. Ogiso and Inui (1961) also obtained a result basically similar to Tucker's, employing a set of visual stimuli. Miron (1961) , on the other hand, found the Potency factor most salient across both American and Japanese Ss, using auditory concepts in a cross-cultural investigation of phonetic symbolism. Somewhat less clearly, Solomon (1954) also demonstrated some Potency scales rotate toward the Evaluative factor when Ss rate sonar signals. On the basis of earlier studies, Tanaka, Oyama and Osgood (1963) conducted a cross-cultural study which put both subject variance and concept variance in perspective. American and Japanese college female Ss rated three different classes of stimulus concepts-i.e., patches of color, line forms, and abstract words-against a constant 35-scale form of translation-equivalent SD. Separate scale-in tercorrelation matrices were computed for each of the six combinations of the concept and culture variables, then these original matrices were correlated with each other across corresponding cells as a measure of overall similarity. If the scale-intercorrelations are more similar across cultures than across different concept classes, the correlations between the matrices of differing concept classes should be lower than those between differing cultures. The correlations, displayed in Table 1 , prove that it is the case. The critical values (Je/A, ; Jw,/A,; and Jf/Af) for the two cultural groups judging the same concept classes are clearly higher than any other values in the same rows and columns. These higher correlations offer evidence that the use of scales is more consistent across the subject groups judging the same concept class than the differing concept classes judged by the same language/culture groups. We also have noted that the following three alternative modifications may occur in concept/scale interaction:
EVIDENCE FOR CONCEPT/SCALE INTERACTION
(1) a coalescence of two or more factors into one (e.g., Potency and Activity into a Dynamism factor); (2) a differentiation of the factor structure which appears as a reduction in the total amount of variance explained by Evaluation, Potency, and Activity, along with the emergence of additional meaningful factors ; and (3) a coloring of the extracted factors in terms of specialized scales applicable to the restricted concept domain. The development of a Personality Differential and its subsequent applications in another concept domain can further illustrate these points in question.
The original development of a Personality Differential (or PD) was carried out in the United States by Ware and Osgood (reported in Osgood, 1962 ). Ware's unpublished data on the factor composition of ratings of personality concepts (e.g., MY-SELF, MY FATHER, MY FRIENDS , etc.) showed a highly differentiated structure made up of eight interpretable dimensions displayed in Table 2 . The eight factors are Morality (variant of Evaluation) , Rationality, Uniqueness, Excitability (variant of Activity), Sociability, Toughness (variant of Potency), Urbanity, and Tangibility . Note the clear indication of differentiation and coloring as scales interacted with concepts in this uniquely restricted concept domain . In this space defined by eight factors , each factor accounts for no more than 8% of the larly by the three groups, and clearly identifiable as Evaluation, Dynamism, Volatility, Uniqueness, and Familiarity, in each group. Second, there are apparent deviations from the earlier Ware-Osgood study. Excitability and Rationality, for example, previously found to be orthogonal factors independent of each other, now appear to coalesce completely into one large Volatility factor. With the only exception of Uniqueness, the Ware-Osgood personality factors nearly completely descompose and coalesce into either of Evaluation, Dynamism, and Volatility. Third, in terms of the amount of variance removed by each factor, there also is a marked deviation from the previous study. The first two factors, Evaluation and Dynamism, accounting for more than 60% of the combined variance in each group , appear to be most important in the judging of nationality concepts. To put it in another way, the Japanese use two major criteria when they judge 32 concepts-namely, whether they are both loved and tender, or both hated and tough, and whether they are both active and strong, or both passive and weak. Many PD scales are found to rotate toward either of the two which uniquely characterize the major semantic dimensions in nation perception, increasing the total amount of variance accounted by them.
Subsequently, a modification of POLDI, or POLDI-II to avoid confusion, was constructed for across-cultural study on Japanese and Germans (Tanaka, Iwamatsu, and May, 1967) . Four subject groups, each consisting of 30 Ss, were used in Japan to check the possible sex differences and interference by concept order. A total of 32 nationality concepts were then rated on a 27-scale form of translation-equivalent POLDI-II both in Japan Note: JM, JF, and GM indicate Japanese male, Japanese female, and German male Ss, while N and Japanese groups. It has been shown that in these studies many scales tend to converge toward the most salient factor (or factors) of the restricted concept class being judged (e.g., colors and forms; personality concepts and nation concepts, etc.) It appears that some specific influence is exerted by the most dominant semantic attributes of the stimulus input, thus influencing judgments within the semantic space. One such important influence is known as" denota- tive confounding". For instance, in the Tanaka-Oyama-Osgood study cited above, Potency connotes by qualities like strong and deep when colors are rated; when forms are judged, properties like angular and sharp carry the Potency connotation; and when abstract words such as LOVE, ETERNITY, ANGER or FEAR are rated , we find that qualities like real and near acquire Potency implications. The denotations thus keep varying with the concept classes being judged, and yet beneath the obvious uniqueness is the common base of affect or" feeling tone". Our evidence indicate that there is a high degree of cross-cultural generality with this respect, semantic factor salience invariably influencing the pattern of concept/scale interaction similarly in different cultures.
EVIDENCE FOR INTERACTION AMONG COGNITIVE ELEMENTS
Using the SD measuring system, Osgood. and Tannenbaum (1955) formulated the general theoretical approach which they termed the Congruity Model, to the problems of semantic interaction.
Briefly, this approach weighs the cognitive elements which enter into interaction by their relative polarization on the composite scale derived from the SD system.
More recently, this approach has been used in several cross-cultural studies and found to provide reasonably good predictions of person concepts (Triandis and Fishbein, 1963 ; Triandis, Tanaka, and Shanmugam, 1966) , perceptual signs (Tanaka, 1964) , and national stereotypic concepts (Tanaka, 1965) , and to hold across different language/culture communities.
Comparisons of the results of predictions from different models (such as attempted in the Triandis-Fishbein or the Triandis-Tanaka-Shanmugam studies) involve a number of alternative ways of evaluating the accuracy of prediction. There are at least three possible measurements by means of which the accuracy of prediction can be compared and evaluated. First, correlation indicates the degree of correspondence between the locations of the predicted and obtained meanings on the scales of measurement.
Second, signed constant deviations between the predicted and obtained meanings can be used and tested by matched t-test for statistical significance. When such 1-test is significant, this indicates that theories are not predicting correctly. One difficulty of this method is that cancellation of errors is possible by alternate directions of errors. Third , the most stringent measure of accuracy of predictions is absolute deviation between the predicted and obtained meanings, since no such cancellation of errors is possible .
Although no direct test of statistical significance is possible by this measure, the avarage absolute deviation can be checked against the general reliability of the measurement system.
The summary results of correlation and absolute deviation analysis are shown in Table 5 with respect to two recent crosscultural studies (Tanaka, 1964 (Tanaka, , 1965 In order to compare the relative accuracy of predictions by two models, the results of a recent Japanese study (Tanaka and Iwamatsu, 1967) were added in the table. These three studies employed somewhat different concept classes-colors and forms were put into interaction in the first study, nationality adjectives (e.g., AMERICAN) and common nouns (e.g., WOMEN) in the second and the third-and subject groups differing in culture and language in the first (American, Finns, and Japanese) and in the second (Americans and Japanese). Despite these differences, nonetheless, it can be clearly seen in the table that all the average correlations are very high for both congruity and simple-average predictions. The average absolute errors per concept approximate only 0.6 scale unit for the congruity predictions and 0.5 for the simple-average. In other words, they are only slightly larger than the average absolute error found in test-retest checks on reliability, and consequently well within the bounds of reasonable accuracy from a practical point of view.
On the basis of these and many other studies reported elsewhere (Tannenbaum, 1967) , it appears quite reasonable to conclude that a law of cognitive consistency holds universally for various cognitive elements put into interaction, despite differences in the concept class sampled and the language/culture base of Ss doing the judging. The fact that the meaning of a complex concept (e.g., a RED color patch cut into a STAR, or AMERICAN WOM-EN, or CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST-INGS) can be persistently predicted from the knowledge of the meanings of its components, suggests that the meaning which we deal with in perceiving numerous cognitive events is subject to consistent variations and is by no means random, as might be expected if all the meanings of all the complex cognitive events were in fact idiosyncratic only to themselves, completely independent of interaction with any other cognitive elements.
EVIDENCE FOR SUBJECT/SCALE INTERACTION
We have reviewed evidence so far for the two major areas of cognitive interaction-the concept/scale and concept/concept interaction. In each area, we have limited ourselves only to those problems uniquely relevant to the affective meaning system. With this limitation, however, many empirical studies are found to offer evidence that various complex cognitive interactions are by no means random, but consistent through time and across cultures. The consistency of such interactions and their cross-cultural generality were illustrated particularly with regard to the first two areas.
It will be an over-simplication, however, if we totally disregard what may be called the subject/scale interaction, the interaction between subject sample and scale sample. Many examples of this sort are quoted in Tanaka, Oyama and Osgood (1963) , Tanaka and Osgood (1965), and Tanaka (1967b) . Table 4 of the present paper also displays a clear case of subject/ scale interaction. For example, a Volatility scale, immoral-moral, is highly associ-ated with excitable-calm and changeable-cons'ant in every Japanese group, as if excitable and changeable nations implied something immoral to the Japanese.
For the Germans, however, immoral-moral appears to constitute an independent criterion of judgment, loading alone very high on the Morality factor. The loading of tender-tough and happy-sad are only secondary on the Morality.
From these factor loadings, it looks as though Germans perceived tender and happy nations as being somewhat immoral, although, of course, this is not very clear because of the relatively low loadings of the two scales on this factor. Yet, it is interesting to note that the use of moral-immoral by the Japanese seems consistent to their traditional values, their persistent attachment to calmness and constancy, whereas the use of the scale by Germans seems to imply their cynicism toward the world. Insensitive-sensitive also displays a clear interaction with subjects. In each of the four Japanese groups, it is a Development scale which highly correlates to naive-sophisticated, whereas it is a Pleasantness scale highly correlating to unpleasant-pleasant for the Germans. A sensitive nation, therefore, may mean a sophisticated, proud, active and quick nation for the Japanese, whereas it may mean a pleasant, agreeable and sociable nation for the Germans. We assume that such scales as moral-immoral and sensitive-insensitive, interacting with subject sample, happen to tap the culturally unique temperament, sensitivity, or criterion of values held by Ss.
Further evidence of subject/scale interaction is reported by Tanaka (1965) in his cross-cultural study of national stereotypes. First, an N of 36 Japanese and 32 American college graduate Ss rated a total of 30 complex national stereotypic concepts on a 12-scale form of semantic differential constructed in the subjects' respective language. The data was then subjected to a centroid factor analysis. The semantic structure of the Japanese and Americans as a group was found to be very simi- tated data demonstrated clearly that Ss use certain sets of scales quite consistently; for instance, pleasant-unpleasant and beautiful-ugly, thick-thin and large-small and heavylight, and active-passive and fast-slow and powerful-powerless, tend to cling together in spite of subjects' different cultural origins and differences in sexes. On the other hand, some scales were found to display clear interaction with Ss : for example, the quiet-noisy scale is used, associated with slow fast and beautiful-ugly, in a majority of the Japanese, whereas it is related to small-large and powerless powerful in a majority of the Americans. In fact, there are very few Japanese who used quiet-noisy in association with small-large or powerlesspowerful, while only few Americans used it, associated with beautiful-ugly. Variations in the subjects' use of this scale appear to be greater across than within the cultural groups. Table 7 summarizes the results accrued from the 68 separate scale-factor analyses for individual Ss. In summarizing the results, the following procedures were taken. For each subject, factor coefficients of each scale on different factors were compared in such a way that we can find what may he termed " affectively synonymous" relations among scales. For instance, one Japanese subject was found to use ugly-beautiful and unpleasant-pleasant as "affectively synonymous" scales , since these two scales and they alone load clearly more highly on a factor. Similar" affectively synonymous" scale-relations were sought on other factors for the same subject. Finally, these relations were tallied over 36 Japanese and over 32 American Ss, separately. Table 7 clearly shows that there are two kinds of scales ; scales which are definitely less susceptible to interaction with Ss, and scales which are definitely more susceptible to interaction with Ss. Note, for example, that the ugly-beautiful and unpleasant-pleasant scales cling together in 27 out of the 36 Japanese and in 30 out of the 32 Americans scales are very stable across Ss differing in sexes and in cultures. On the other hand, scales such as industrious-lazy or foolish-wise show no such clear, consistent synonymous relations with any other scales, reflecting great cross-subject variations. Furthermore, some more exceptional cases of subject/scale interaction were noted, although they are not specified in the table. One such interactions is known as"factorial nuance reversal" (cf. Tanaka, Oyama & Osgood, 1963) . In the present case, many Ss in both cultural groups tended to use industrious-lazy, associated with wise foolish. A few Japanese and Americans, however, used the industrious-lazy scale in association with foolish-wise, thus the direction of association being totally reversed. For a majority of both Japanese and American Ss, being industrious is seen as being wise, but, for a minority of Ss, both Japanese and American, it is seen as being foolish. Next, many Ss in both groups used certain scales entirely independent of any other scales. For example, 6 out of 36 Japanese used the industrious-lazy scale as an independent criterion of judgments ; it and it alone loading high on a semantic factor. Similarly, 9 out of 32 Americans used the undemocratic-democratic scale with no association whatsoever with any other scales.
In summary, the foregoing analyses of individual subjects' semantic spaces clearly confirm that individual differences in semantic structure do indeed exist, although we also have evidence for overall consistency of such spaces. The reported variations in the individual subjects' semantic spaces may suggest that somewhat different sets of scales are serving as indicants of semantic factors for different individuals. Such variations seem to be somewhat greater across Ss having different cultural origins than across Ss having culturally homogeneous backgrounds.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Cross-cultural studies were reported to examine generality in cognitive interaction. Cognitive interaction was discussed with regard to the three general areas-i.e., concept/scale interaction, interaction among cognitive elements, and subject/scale interaction. First, overall cross-cultural generality was demonstrated along with crossconcept uniqueness. With respect to the cross-concept uniqueness, it was found that the earlier Osgood-Ware personality factors nearly completely decompose and coalesce into POLDI factors, presumably because of the scales interacting with the heterogeneous concept samples. In connection with the cross-cultural generality, the POLDI factors were found to be very similar across two culturally heterogeneous groups; factors cut across both cultural groups and are almost equally defined by both, despite differences in language, culture, sex, and concept orders. Second, it was demonstrated that a law of cognitive interaction holds universally for various cognitive elements put into interaction, in spite of differences in the concept class sampled and the language/culture base of Ss doing the judging. Third, on the other hand, evidence was shown that different Ss do use somewhat different semantic structures in their judgments. Variations in individual subjects' spaces seem to be greater across than within the cultural groups. Here we face contradiction between the cross-cultural generality and the cultural uniqueness of semantic space.
The results of the studies reported here, however, indicate that the effect of interaction between the scale sample and the subject sample is relatively small in the determination of semantic structure. Furthermore, Levin's (1963) reexamination of the Ware-Osgood data on personality differential, employing the three-mode factor analysis developed by Tucker (1963) , also suggests that variance accounted for by the subject variables in the semantic space is minimal, compared with variance explained by the scale variables and variance accounted for by the concept vari-ables.
Thus, we may hold that greater generality operates across different cultures than does within-culture uniqueness in our cognitive interaction.
